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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




MICHAEL A. DEBORD, 
 












          NO. 44743 
 
          Nez Perce County Case No.  
          CR-2015-2702 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Debord failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation and executing his unified sentence of five years, with two years 
fixed, imposed following his guilty plea to grand theft? 
 
 
Debord Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 On April 22, 2015, Debord went to Paula Coumbe’s residence “to help her 
move.”  (PSI, p.26.1)  When Paula stepped outside to assist a neighbor child, Debord 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “SC# 
44743 State v. DeBord-Confidential Exhibit.pdf.”   
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remained inside her home and, a short time later, he exited “with a large white garbage 
bag and told her he was going to the store to buy cigarettes.”  (PSI, p.28.)  Paula “went 
back in the house and immediately noticed some items were missing,” including two 
Kindle tablets, an iPod Touch, a smaller iPod, and numerous rings.  (PSI, pp.26, 28.)  In 
addition, Paula noted that her Nikon Coolpix S220 camera and her pink ViperTek stun 
device “fell out of a bag she saw Debord carry away from her residence.”  (PSI, p.26.)   
When officers responded, they located Debord in the neighborhood, hiding under 
a camper with a large knife “immediately in front of him.”  (PSI, pp.26-27.)  Upon 
searching Debord’s person for weapons, officers found seven knives, a knife sharpener, 
and brass knuckles that “appeared to have a blade function as well.”  (PSI, pp.22, 27.)  
Officers also found the “large white garbage bag” nearby, which contained numerous 
items including another “large knife in a green sheath,” two Kindle tablets, an iPod, and 
the brown coat that Paula had seen Debord wearing earlier in the day.  (PSI, p.27.)  
Inside the coat pockets and liner, officers discovered three debit cards and a Visa card 
“in the name of Paula Coumbe,” a Visa debit gift card, an H&R Block MasterCard, 
seven rings, a pink flashlight, several reward/points cards, an envelope opener, three 
“pieces of jewelry,” and a pill container with “1 COR 132, a Schedule 2 prescription 
drug, 4 3TV150 acetaminophen and codein[e] phosphate 300mg, 6 E78 (Zolpidem 
5mg), as well as 1 4H2 (Cetirizine 10mg).”  (PSI, p.27 (parenthetical notations original).)   
The state charged Debord with carrying a concealed weapon without a permit, 
petit theft, and three counts of grand theft.  (R., pp.15, 43, 97-98.)  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Debord pled guilty to one count of grand theft and the state dismissed the 
remaining charges.  (R., pp.103-04, 142-45.)  While this case was pending, Debord 
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failed to appear for a preliminary conference on July 6, 2015; for his substance abuse 
evaluation on September 8, 2015 and also for his presentence interview; and for his 
sentencing hearing on May 3, 2016.  (R., pp.77, 107, 109, 116, 129-30.)  In each 
instance, a bench warrant was issued and Debord was eventually arrested.  (R., pp.87, 
110, 131.)  At the sentencing hearing held on June 23, 2016, the district court imposed 
a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, suspended the sentence, and 
placed Debord on supervised probation for three years.  (R., pp.153-59.)  The court 
specifically warned Debord that any future probation violation would result in the 
execution of his prison sentence.  (R., p.146.)   
Less than four months later, Debord’s probation officer filed a report of violation 
alleging that Debord had violated the conditions of his probation by absconding 
supervision.  (R., pp.160-61.)  A bench warrant was issued and, after Debord was 
located and arrested, the matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing, during which the 
district court found that Debord violated his probation as alleged.  (R., pp.165, 168-69.)  
The district court revoked Debord’s probation and executed the underlying sentence.  
(R., pp.171-74.)  Debord filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order 
revoking probation.  (R., pp.182-84.)   
Debord asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his 
probation in light of his “commitment to his rehabilitation,” full-time job, and because, 
while he “knew it was his responsibility to keep in contact” with his probation officer, he 
“‘didn’t realize the gravity’ of his error in judgment at the time.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6 
(quoting Tr., p.33, Ls.18-20).)  Debord has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.   
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“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4).   
The decision whether to revoke a defendant's probation for a violation is within the 
discretion of the district court.  State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, ___, 390 P.3d 434, 436 
(2017) (quoting State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 
2003)).  In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the 
probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of 
society.  State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793, 797, 302 P.3d 1066, 1070 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(citations omitted).  A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon 
a showing that the trial court abused its discretion.  Id. at 798, 302 P.3d at 1071 (citing 
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
Debord is not a suitable candidate for probation, particularly in light of his 
ongoing failures to appear, failures to comply with court orders, and disregard for the 
law and the terms of community supervision.  His criminal history includes convictions 
for several alcohol age violations, negligent driving, hit and run unattended vehicle, 
invalid driver’s license, DWS, malicious mischief, theft, assault, burglary, possession of 
stolen property, and delivery of methamphetamine.  (PSI, pp.5-7.)  At the time of 
sentencing, he had outstanding warrants for charges of unlawful entry and DWP.  (PSI, 
pp.7-8.)  Debord also has a 20-year history of violating the law by using 
methamphetamine, and he admitted that he was “using daily” before his arrest for the 
instant offense in April 2015.  (PSI, pp.1, 4, 13-14.)   
Debord’s disregard for the law and his legal obligations continued while this case 
was pending.  He failed to appear for court hearing on July 6, 2015, and committed (and 
was later convicted of) the new crime of willful concealment on July 14, 2015.  (R., p.77; 
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PSI, p.8.)  He subsequently failed to appear for both his presentence interview and his 
substance abuse evaluation in September 2015, and neither the presentence 
investigator nor the substance abuse evaluator succeeded in their attempts to contact 
him.  (PSI, p.18; R., pp.107, 109, 116.)  Ultimately, Debord was arrested and held in the 
county jail until the interviews could be conducted.  (PSI, p.18.)  Staff at the Tyler Shaw 
House, where Debord was residing in late 2015, reported that Debord had returned to 
“‘active’” substance abuse by November 2015.  (PSI, p.10.)  In December 2015, Debord 
failed to appear for court hearings in his unlawful entry and DWP cases, resulting in the 
outstanding warrants for those charges.  (PSI, pp.8-9.)  Finally, Debord failed to appear 
for his sentencing hearing in this case.  (R., p.129.)  At no time throughout the pendency 
of this case did Debord hold himself accountable and turn himself in after failing to 
appear.  (R., pp.87, 110, 131; PSI, pp.8-9, 18.)   
Debord was finally sentenced for the instant offense on June 23, 2016, at which 
time the court specifically warned him that any probation violation in this case would 
result in his imprisonment.  (R., p.146.)  As a condition of his probation, Debord was 
required to complete the 30-day inpatient treatment program that he had started “and 
provide the Court with documentation within the next month.”  (R., pp.141, 157; Tr., 
p.24, Ls.24-25.)  However, Debord did not return to the treatment facility until more than 
a month later and consequently did not complete the program until August 26, 2016.  
(Tr., p.24, Ls.1-9.)  He next met with his probation officer “around the 15th of September” 
(Tr., p.19, L.20), at which time his probation officer “made it specifically clear to [Debord] 
that he needed to maintain contact with me because he didn’t have a phone and there 
was no way I could reach him.  I needed to know exactly where he would be staying 
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and what he was up to.  …  He left my office after that meeting, and then I never heard 
from him since” (Tr., p.11, Ls.6-12).  Debord’s probation officer also told him that he was 
required to remain in Idaho until an interstate compact was approved.  (R., p.160.)  
Later the same day, the probation officer left a message with Debord’s wife – which 
Debord received – instructing Debord to return the call.  (Tr., p.26, Ls.11-16.)  Although 
Debord claims he returned his probation officer’s call that day and “left messages” (Tr., 
p.30, Ls.5-22), and that he tried to call again a few days later, Debord’s probation officer 
testified that no message was ever received (Tr., p.14, Ls.14-20; p.31, Ls.19-24).  After 
making multiple unsuccessful attempts to contact Debord via phone and by going to his 
reported place of residence several times, Debord’s probation officer filed the report of 
violation, on October 7, 2016, advising that Debord had absconded supervision.  (R., 
pp.160-61; Tr., p.14, L.2.)  The district court subsequently issued a bench warrant and, 
when Debord learned of the warrant, he left the state and went to Washington.  (R., 
p.164; Tr., p.35, Ls.15-21.)  He was not located and arrested on the warrant until 
November 14, 2016.  (R., p.13.)                  
At the disposition hearing, the state aptly noted that Debord “really did not 
engage in probation whatsoever.”  (Tr., p.38, Ls.2-3.)  Indeed, following his release from 
inpatient treatment, Debord met with his probation officer only once – three weeks after 
his release – and then promptly absconded.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.11-12; p.19, L.20; p.24, Ls.8-
9.)  He made no effort to report to the probation office in person, and he testified that 
“the last time [he] tried calling” his probation officer was “roughly five days after” he was 
instructed to call, which would have been on or about September 20, 2016.  (Tr., p.34, 
Ls.16-17; p.35, Ls.2-4.)  Debord claimed that, after that call was unsuccessful, he “just 
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assumed that [his probation officer] would get a hold of [him],” despite the fact that his 
probation officer had been unable to contact him by phone, he was not staying at his 
reported address, he left the State of Idaho, and he failed to make contact with his 
probation officer for a full two months.  (R., p.160; Tr., p.10, Ls.4-13; p.34, Ls.17-19; 
p.35, Ls.15-21.)   
An offender’s decision to abscond, no matter the reason, prevents authorities 
from ensuring that probation is serving its intended function.  In no way can probation 
meet the goals of protecting the community and rehabilitation if the probationer chooses 
to remove himself from probation supervision.  See State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 
860, 452 P.2d 350, 357 (1969) (citing State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 436 P.2d 706 (1968)) 
(emphasis added) (purpose of probation is to give the offender “an opportunity to be 
rehabilitated under proper control and supervision”).  Debord was fully aware that failing 
to stay in contact with his probation officer and absconding supervision was in violation 
of the conditions of his probation, and he was not deterred by the knowledge that his 
entire sentence could be imposed.  His decision to disregard his legal obligations in this 
case is a continuation of his pattern of criminal conduct and demonstrates his failure to 
rehabilitate and his continued risk to the community.  Debord is not an appropriate 
candidate for community supervision in light of his unwillingness to abide by the terms 
of release by making himself unavailable for supervision and his repeated decisions to 
fail to appear for his mandatory appointments and court dates.   
At the disposition hearing, the district court articulated its reasons for revoking 
Debord’s probation.  (Tr., p.38, L.6 – p.39, L.18.)  The state submits that Debord has 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached 
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excerpt of the disposition hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on 
appeal.  (Appendix A.)   
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
revoking Debord’s probation and executing his underlying sentence. 
       




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of August, 2017, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to: 
 
REED P. ANDERSON  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 























The defendant failed to, even at this time, 
really accept full responsibility of what he 's done . He 
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really did not engage in probation whatsoever. 
that, the State would argue for that. 
THE COURT: Thank you . 
Mr. DeBord, you have quite a his tory 
Based on 
7 generally and also j ust in th is case specifically . 
8 The re is a lengthy criminal record, which was taken into 
9 account prior to today. There's been a -- I r ealize a 
10 l ong time ago, but there was a prior rider , r eta i ned 
11 jurisdiction, which you failed on, and the Cour t 
12 relinquished jurisdiction in that case . 
13 In this case, there's been several f a i lure 





this matter. The change of plea was clear ba ck in 
August of 2015. There was a fa ilure to appear at a 
sentencing after that . It required an arrest on that 
cas e . Sentencing was delayed time and t ime and time 
19 again, loo king for inpat ient treatment, apparently . 
20 
21 
Eventually, sentencing was completed after 
two additional arrests . On June 23rd, at that time, 
22 there was a recommenda tion for at leas t a retained 
23 jurisdiction . Based on your efforts to seek your own 
24 inpatient treatment, I did not do tha t . My notes 
25 clearly ind icate that I told you at that time, thoug h , 
APPENDIX A – Page 2 
1 it was your last chance . If I found a probation 
2 violation , I was going to simply bypass the retained 




I t would appear, given your history , you 
would know the severity of the consequences for not 
maintaining contact with your probation of f icer. There 
7 was the warrant, which you admit you knew of, and there 
39 
8 was no attempt to talk to your probation officer or turn 
9 yourself in on that warrant. You remained out of touch, 
10 basically absconding until the -- you were arrested on 
11 that . 
12 Based on that , based on my former promise to 
13 you , I am, based on finding you in v i o l ation , revoking 












matter of not less than two years , nor more than five 
yea rs. I will give you credit for time served and 
reimpose the court costs and public defender fees in 
t his matter. 
Anything further , Mr . Cuddihy? 
MR. CUDDIHY : No . Thank you, Your Honor . 
THE COURT : Mr . Coleman? 
MR . COLEMAN: No. Thank you. 
THE COURT : We'll be in recess . 
(COU RT IN RECESS . ) 
Thank you . 
